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Abstract We describe the strategy used by our agent, IAMhaggler2011,
which finished in third place in the 2011 Automated Negotiating Agent Com-
petition. A key feature of this agent is the way in which it models the likely
negotiation behaviour of its opponent. Specifically, it first uses a Gaussian
process regression technique to estimate the future concession of its negotia-
tion opponent. Its concession is then set as a best response to this prediction.
1 Introduction
In this work, we give a brief overview of the core parts of the strategy used
by our agent, IAMhaggler2011, which finished in third place in the second
international Automated Negotiating Agent Competition (ANAC 2011). The
competition setup is described in [1]. The overall framework used by the agent
is based on that of our previous (2010) competition entry, IAMhaggler[3]. A
more detailed description of IAMhaggler2011 and an analysis of its perfor-
mance can be found in [4].
The core of the strategy used by IAMhaggler2011 consists of three parts,
which we describe in turn. The first predicts the concession of the opponent
(Section 2). The second sets the concession rate such that it optimises the
expected utility given that prediction (Section 3). The final part generates a
multi-issue offer according to the concession rate (Section 4).
2 Predicting the Opponent’s Concession
In order to set its behaviour as a best response to that of the opponent,
our agent first needs to predict how the opponent will concede throughout
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the negotiation, using only the information which it can observe: the offers
made by the opponent, and the utility of these offers according to our agent’s
utility function. This is done using a Gaussian process regression technique,
in order to provide both a prediction of the opponent’s future concession and
a measure of the level of confidence in that prediction (see [2] for details).
The output of the Gaussian process is a Gaussian distribution, for each
time t, denoted by f(u;µt, σt), where the mean, µt, gives an indication of
the most likely value for u at time t, whilst the standard deviation, σt is an
indication of how accurate the prediction of µt is likely to be.
As input to the Gaussian process, IAMhaggler2011 uses the maximum
value offered by the opponent in a particular time window of a fixed duration,
and the time of that window. This windowed approach reduces the effect of
noise on the Gaussian process and reduces the amount of input data. The
maximum value in each time window is used, rather than the average, as
the maximum represents the best offer that has been observed, and therefore
that our agent can expect to reach agreement at.
3 Setting the Concession Rate
We now show how the prediction of the opponent’s future concession is used
by our strategy to set its concession rate by optimising the expected util-
ity given that prediction. Specifically, we discuss the way in which both the
mean, µ, and standard deviation, σ, output by the Gaussian process are used
in setting an optimal concession rate. Optimal in this context means that our
strategy maximises the agent’s expected utility given its prediction of the op-
ponent. The aim is to calculate the best time, t∗ and utility value, u∗ at which
to reach agreement. We consider the best time, t∗, to be the point in future
time (t ∈ [tc, tmax]) at which the expected utility, Erec(t) of the opponent’s
offer is likely to be maximised. The expected utility of reaching an agreement
at time t is given by Erec(t) =
∫ 1
0
D(R(u)f(u;µt, σt), t)du where D(·, ·) is the
effect of the discounting factor, R(·) is the risk function, and f(·) is the prob-
ability distribution over the values of u, as given by the Gaussian process.1
Our strategy considers the risk associated with reaching agreement at a
particular utility. In a tournament setting, such as the one used in ANAC
2011, the primary aim of the strategy is to ‘win’ the negotiation by achieving
a higher utility than that of its opponent. In such a setting, reaching an agree-
ment with a high utility is not always good enough, since it is possible that
the opponent may have achieved an even higher utility, thereby winning the
negotiation. Consequently, the strategy may need to take a more aggressive
approach than it would if it were simply maximising its own utility.
1 Due to the constraints on the utility functions used in the competition, we assume that
the utility of the opponent’s offers must lie in the range [0, 1]. Therefore we use a truncated
normal distribution, with the utility constrained to fit in that range.
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In order to deal with this trade-off, we adjust the behaviour of our agent by
including the concept of risk attitude in the design of our concession strategy.
Formally, the risk function used is R(u) = ur where r is the risk parameter.
If r = 1, the strategy is risk-neutral, for r > 1, the strategy is risk-seeking
and for r < 1, it is risk-averse. A risk-seeking strategy would result in more
aggressive behaviour, since such an agent will concede more slowly, as it will
regard lower utilities to be of even lower value than their true value. This has
the effect of making the agent more likely to win in a tournament setting,
and is therefore more appropriate in the negotiation competition.
Thus, the effect of the standard deviation, σt is as follows. If, at two points
in time, t1 and t2, the mean values are the same (µt1 = µt2), but the standard
deviation differs such that σt1 < σt2 , then a risk-seeking agent will consider
the expected utility at time t2 to be greater than at time t1. That is, the risk-
seeking agent is prepared to wait for the less certain offer at time t2, as there
is a higher chance that the utility may exceed the value of µt2 , than it would
for µt1 . The converse applies for risk-averse agents, with risk-neutral agents
being indifferent between the two solutions. In the ACAN 2011 tournament,
we used a risk-seeking approach, with r = 3.
Having selected the time, t∗, at which the expected utility of the oppo-
nent’s offers is maximised, our agent needs to choose a utility, u∗, to of-
fer at that time. The approach that our strategy takes here is to maximise
the expected utility, of making an offer of utility u at time t∗, as given by
u∗ = argmaxu∈[0,1]Eoffer(u, t
∗).
The expected utility is calculated based on the probability that an offer
of a given utility will be accepted. We assume that an offer of utility u will
be accepted at time t∗ if u ≤ ut∗ . Since we have a probability distribution
over ut∗ , we can calculate the probability that u ≤ ut∗ using the cumulative
distribution F (u;µt, σt). Therefore, our agent’s expectation for the adjusted
utility (taking into consideration the risk attitude and time discounting) of an
offer with utility u is given by Eoffer(u, t
∗) = D(R(u)F (u;µt∗ , σt∗), t∗) where
D(·, ·) and R(·) are as before, and F (·) is the c.d.f. for f(·). Due to the effect
of the standard deviation, note that the risk-seeking agent will find a higher
optimal utility than a risk-neutral or risk-averse agent.
Finally, having determined u∗ as the utility to offer at time t∗, our agent
needs to choose a target utility, uτ to offer at the current time, tc. The agent
should not concede immediately to offer u∗ at the current time, nor should
it wait until t∗. Either of those approaches is likely to result in concession
behaviour which is too extreme, especially since they are based on predictions
which may be inaccurate. Therefore, and to avoid any additional parameters,
our approach is simply to concede linearly between [tlr, ulr] and [t
∗, u∗], where
tlr is the time at which the regression was last performed and ulr is the target
utility at that time. The overall concession will not generally be linear, as
the predictions of t∗ and u∗ are revised at the end of each time window,
throughout the negotiation.
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4 Generating an Offer
Having selected a target utility, uτ , our strategy needs to generate an offer
which has a utility close to that target. In a multi-issue negotiation, there
may be many different packages with a similar utility. Under the real-time
constraints of the competition, the goal is to reach an agreement within a
shorter time period, but not necessarily to limit the number of offers made.
Consequently, our agent uses a fast strategy, which simply chooses a ran-
dom offer with a utility in the range [uτ − 0.025, uτ + 0.025]. A range is used,
since, in a domain which consists entirely of discrete issues, it is highly likely
that there are no possible outcomes with a utility of exactly uτ . If an offer
cannot be found even within this range, the range is expanded, until a so-
lution is found. In addition, if the target drops below the highest value of
the offers made by the opponent, we instead propose the package with that
utility that was offered by the opponent. This is since we assume that, for a
set of possible offers with utility greater than uτ , the one which is most likely
to be accepted is the one which has previously been offered by the opponent.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we have developed a negotiation strategy that uses a principled
approach to concession, by setting its behaviour as a best response, according
to its estimate of the opponent’s future concession. In future work, we plan
to improve our offer generation algorithm by modelling the opponent’s pref-
erences, and then choose a package at a given utility level which maximises
the likelihood that it is accepted by the opponent.
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